Pan Am at War by Mark Cotta Vaz

Author:Mark Cotta Vaz
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781510729513
Publisher: Skyhorse
Published: 2018-03-21T16:00:00+00:00

By 1941, LATI and Condor were openly working for Axis interests. LATI’s passenger lists were made up of Lufthansa pilots who were naturalized Brazilian citizens but returning to Germany for Luftwaffe duty. The Italian line also flew off-course over the ocean to inspect targets for German submarines.38 Reports conveyed that if LATI’s fuel supply were cut off, the Germans would deliver a cargo of gasoline drums to them from Dakar, the French colony on the African coast.39 It was suspected that Condor’s seaplane base at Natal was radioing Berlin about ship and plane movements, but no evidence was found. The search even led to a seminary where five German Catholic priests lived—again, no clandestine spy station. Frustrated local authorities simply padlocked Condor’s radio facilities.40

Natal was a hotbed of intrigue, particularly after an American military survey mission in July of 1941 concluded it was a likely landing place in an Axis invasion.41 Harold Sims, U.S. vice counsel at Natal, was always on the lookout for potential threats. In a March 22, 1941, report to Jefferson Caffery, U.S. ambassador to Brazil stationed in Rio, Sims reported that LATI appeared to be storing fuel “in small lots throughout the interior or along the coast, either for use by airplanes or thirsty submarines.”42 In a confidential May 5, 1941, memo to Caffery, Sims reported his suspicions that Panair’s manager was “definitely detrimental to our work here . . . by virtue of the fact that he has some business relations with LATI, CONDOR and AIR FRANCE, and full access to Parnamarin [sic] field where Panair is to build a base, he might be slowing down the activity.”43 On August 14, Sims reported to the U.S. Secretary of State that a flammable bomb was ignited in a Standard Oil warehouse near the ADP base, but an alert night watchman extinguished the fire. In November, Sims reported to Caffery that a Japanese diplomat named Masakatsu Nosaki spent three days in Natal taking photographs of ADP work and was inexplicably left alone by police, although assumptions were that it was due to his diplomatic status.44

U.S. Military Intelligence Division reports were concerned about the ambiguity of Brazil President Getúlio Vargas’ allegiance. Ambassador Caffery later reflected, confidentially, “had President Vargas not come over to our side, we would have been compelled, I assume, to occupy Northeast Brazil by force of arms.”45

The prevailing sentiment was that the U.S. not impose its will militarily—it didn’t need to. It was determined that General Gomes, Brazil’s air commander of the Natal-Recife area, was in control of Brazil’s strategic ­northeast and his good will would facilitate the U.S. military presence. Colonel Robert Olds, commander of the Ferrying Command, successfully cultivated Gomes’ friendship and cooperation.46

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